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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
HANOVER LIMITED, a partnership; 
WESTERN MAINTENANCE AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion; and BROOKE GRANT, an 
individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a 
Kansas corporation; CESSNA 
FINANCE CORPORATION, a Kansas 
corporation; TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES, 
INC., a California corporation; 
AAR NORTHWEST, INC., a Delaware 
corporation; and TRANS WEST 
AIRCRAFT SALES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
TRANS-WEST AIRCRAFT SALES, INC., 
Cross Claim Defendant 
and Appellant, 
vs, 
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a 
Kansas corporation, 
Cross Claim Defendant 
and Respondent. 
-. 860051 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTER ON APPEAL 
I 
Is a retailer entitled to be indemnified for 
damages suffered by it when it is named|in a product liability 
action, which damages include its attorney's fees and costs, 
from the manufacturer of the claimed defective product. 
Did the Trial Court err in not trying the issue of 
whether or not the aircraft was defective, and whether or 
not Trans-West was a passive tortfeasor as opposed to an 
active tortfeasor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action based on a cross claim of the 
Defendant-Appellant, Trans-West Aircraft Sales, Inc., (Trans-
West) a Utah corporation, against the Defendant-Respondent, 
Cessna Aircraft Company, (Cessna) a Kansas corporation, 
seeking indemnification for damages suffered by Trans-West 
in defending itself in the product liability action brought 
by the plaintiffs claiming that an aircraft designed and 
manufactured by Cessna was defective. 
The complaint and all cross claims were compromised 
and settled, except for the cross claim of Trans-West Aircraft 
Sales against Cessna Aircraft Company and Cessna Finance 
Company. 
From cross motions for summary judgment, Trans-
West appeals from summary judgment in favor of Cessna of no 
cause of action and from the order denying its motion for 
summary judgment in its favor and from the order striking 
the trial of the matter as to whether or not the aircraft 
was in fact defective and Trans-West was not an active 
tortfeasor. 
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The following facts are uncontroverted: 
1. Defendant, cross-claimant I appellant, Trans-
West Aircraft Sales, Inc., (Trans-West) is a Utah corporation 
with its principal place of business at the Salt Lake City 
International Airport. (Complaint, R-oi, Para. 6; Answer of 
Trans-West, R-118; Affidavit, Battochiol R-272) 
2. Defendant, cross-defendant, respondent, Cessna 
Aircraft Company, (Cessna) is a Kansas-based aircraft manufacturer 
engaged in the designing, manufacturing, equipping and 
marketing of light aircraft which it markets through what 
the plaintiffs denominate as the Cessna System. (Cessna's 
Answers to Interrogatories, R-914, No. \5; Complaint, R-02, 
Para. 2, R-03, Para. 7? and Answer of Tijrans-West, R-118) 
3. Cessna markets its aircraft through a system 
of franchised aircraft retail dealers who acquire their 
aircraft from Cessna franchised zone distributors, or wholly 
owned zone distributors. (R-94) 
4. Trans-West, at the time of the sale of the 
1979 Cessna Aircraft P-210, the subject matter of the product 
liability suit, was a franchised Cessna Aircraft retail 
dealer. (Complaint, R-04, Para. 13; An$wer of Trans-West, 
R-118, R-908) 
5. Trans-West, in selling Cessna aircraft to the 
public, purchased all Cessna airplanes ifrom the regional 
franchised zone distributor, the defendant, AAR Northwest 
-3-
Inc. (AAR) , not a party to this appeal, who in turn purchased 
the aircraft from Cessna directly. (Affidavit, Jeno Battochio, 
October 15, 1982. (R-273,274; R-04, Para. 17) 
6. The aircraft in question was acquired by AAR 
from Cessna in March 197 9, which used it as a demonstrator. 
The plane is described as a pressurized single engine, high 
wing, six passenger aircraft, Cessna, Model P-210. This 
aircraft was sold by AAR to Trans-West, who in turn acted as 
a conduit for the sale of the aircraft to the plaintiffs, 
Hanover Limited (Hanover), and Western Maintenance and 
Management Inc., a Utah corporation. This sale from AAR to 
Trans-West to Hanover was a back-to-back transaction, which 
was consummated all on one day, April 18, 1979. (Complaint, 
R-04, Para. 14, 17; Reply of Cessna to Cross-claim, R-1233; 
Affidavit, Battochio, R-274) 
7. The aircraft was not modified, changed, repaired, 
or otherwise worked on by the defendant, Trans-West, from 
the time of its sale by AAR to Trans-West and its sale and 
delivery on the same day by Trans-West to the plaintiffs. 
(Depo, Battochio, July 12, 1985, p. 7, R-1417, et. seq.) 
8. Trans-West denied having made any representations 
as to the merchantable quality of the aircraft to the plaintiffs 
or any statement whatsoever about P-210 aircraft, except 
those representations contained in Cessna prepared advertising 
materials. This was admitted by the plaintiff, Brooke 
-4-
; Depo, Grant, pp. 
Grant, who was the principal executive bfficer of Hanover, 
who in his deposition stated that TransFWest made no other 
representations about the aircraft other than what the 
Cessna sales brochures stated. (R-1304J 
86, 87, Addendum) This admission was ih direct controvention 
to the allegations of the complaint. Farther, Cessna admitted 
that Trans-West made no express warrantees other than those 
contained within Cessna's advertising materials. (R-1303) 
9. The plaintiff, Brooke Grant, testified with 
respect to the representations of Transf-West' s president, 
Mr. Battochio, prior to the sale of the aircraft: 
"Q. Over and above the information contained in 
that brochure or those brochures, did he tell 
you anything additional that was in those 
brochures about the performance of the 
aircraft? 
"A. I don't think so. You m$an did he make any 
recommendations outside pf what Cessna was 
representing? I don't remember. I 
don't remember that he djld." 
(Depo, Grant, p. 86, Addendum) 
10. Trans-West did not maintain at any time 
germane to the sale of this aircraft: 
(a) an aircraft repair facility, 
(b) an aircraft maintenance facility, 
(c) an aircraft manufacturing facility, 
(d) a test facility of &ny kind; 
and Cessna knew this to be a fact prior to the commencement 
of plaintiffs' action and at all times cjluring the prosecution 
-5-
of the same, (Depo, Battochio, July 12, 1985, p. 10, R-1417, 
et. seq.) 
11. Trans-West only maintained and operated a 
retail sales agency for the sale of aircraft and in particular, 
new and used Cessna aircraft, and Cessna knew this prior to 
the commencement of plaintiffs1 action and at all times 
during the prosecution of the same. (Depo, Battochio, p. 
10, R-1417, et. seq.) 
12. Trans-West did not formulate, write, print, 
produce, or otherwise generate sales manuals, advertisements, 
news releases and pilot's operating data, but utilized the 
material advertising Cessna aircraft supplied it by Cessna 
and Cessna Finance Company, not a party to this appeal, and 
Cessna knew this prior to the commencement of plaintiffs1 
action and at all times during the prosecution of the same. 
(Cessna Finance Answers to Interrogatories dated October 6, 
1983, Nos. 6, 7, R-714; R-912-914) 
13. Trans-West did not design, manufacture, 
assemble, inspect or test Cessna Aircraft and in particular, 
the P-210, or any component thereof, and Cessna knew this 
prior to the commencement of plaintiffs' action and at all 
times during the prosecution of the same. (R-916-917) 
14. Trans-West had no duty to nor did it publish, 
discriminate, distribute or mail to its customers airworthiness 
-6-
directives or emergency airworthiness directives, and Cessna 
knew this prior to the commencement of plaintiffs1 action 
and at all times during the prosecution of the same. (R-927) 
15. Trans-West made no express warranties of the 
P-210 aircraft but did give the plaintiffs a copy of the 
standard Cessna printed warranty. (Depo, Battochio, p. 22, 
R-1417, et.. seg. ; Depo, Grant, p. 86, Addendum) 
16. The plaintiffs or the otjier defendants failed 
to prove that Trans-West did anything m0re than merely act 
as the selling conduit of the aircraft in question or sold 
the aircraft in a negligent manner. 
17. AAR Northwest, Inc., was the point of contact 
and communication between Cessna and appointed retail dealer-
ships, including Trans-West, as the zont distributor, at the 
time of the purchase of the P-210 by the plaintiffs, and any 
communication involving Cessna by Transj-West was made directly 
with AAR and not with Cessna. However, 
filed, Cessna had substituted a company 
for AAR. (Affidavit, Jeno Battochio, October 15, 1982, R-273) 
18. Immediately following th^ service of summons 
and complaint in this matter, Trans-West's president, Jeno 
Battochio, called the Cessna zone manager, Bob Conover, then 
manager of the wholly owned Cessna Zone distributorship at 
Troutdale, Oregon, and advised him that Trans-West was being 
when the action was 
owned zone distributor 
sued over the P-210 and asked him if Cessna would defend 
-7-
Trans-West on the suit. (Depo, Battochio, p. 13, R-1417f 
et. seq.) 
19. Cessna through the zone manager declined to 
assume the defense of Trans-West and at no time thereafter 
did Cessna undertake the defense of this action for Trans-
West. (Depo, Battochio, p. 14, R-1417, et.. seq.) 
20. Cessna's zone manager was not aware of any of 
the allegations of the complaint when he declined to defend 
Trans-West on this suit. (Depo, Battochio, pp. 14, 20, R-
1417, et.. seq. ) 
21. After months of protracted pre-trial discovery, 
the plaintiffs and the defendant Cessna entered into settlement 
negotiations, but at no time did Trans-West either participate 
or join in the negotiations. The matter was ultimately 
settled. However, under the settlement agreement, Trans-
West did not pay any part of the agreed settlement figure 
and refused to dismiss its cross-claims against Cessna and 
Cessna Finance Company for indemnification of its costs and 
expenses incurred in defending the action, which included 
its attorney's fees. (Stipulation of Dismissal, R-1246-
1248) 
22. Trans-West, in addition to court costs, 
deposition costs and pre-trial discovery expenses, in the 
amount of $118.00, incurred attorney's fees in the sum of 
$6,910.00 or a total of $7,028.00. (R-1359, 1362-1365) 
-8-
23. Trans-West asserts that its costs, expenses 
and attorney's fees are damages which itj incurred and is now 
looking for indemnification from Cessna for those expenses 
and costs. 
24. The matter was set down ijor trial on the 
issue of whether or not the subject airdraft was in fact 
defective and whether or not the financing of the aircraft 
by Cessna Finance was tortious as asserted by the plaintiff, 
and whether Trans-West did in fact act in such a way that 
would be construed to be an active participant in the negligence 
complained of by the plaintiff. (R-1324) This trial date 
was stricken upon the granting of the summary judgment in 
favor of Cessna and Cessna Finance, thereby precluding 
Trans-West from adjudicating the issue of liability of 
either Trans-West or Cessna under plaintiff's complaint. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT^  
1. A retail seller is entitled to indemnification 
from a manufacturer in a product liability action. 
2. A retail seller does not have to make a written 
tender of defense to the manufacturer t<& activate the duty 
of indemnification. 
3. A retail seller may predicate the right to 
indemnification on the theory of implied contract between 
the retail seller and the manufacturer. 
-9-
4. In the case before the Court the right of 
indemnification exists regardless of the legal theory used. 
5. Legal fees and costs are a part of the damages 
that the retail seller is entitled to against the manufacturer 
in obtaining indemnification. 
6. A claim of indemnification may be asserted by 
cross claim or third party complaint. 
7. Under the facts of this case the manufacturer 
knew that the retail seller was a passive party and, therefore, 
entitled to indemnification and defense. 
8. A retail seller who does nothing more than 
sell a product without alteration, repair or other involvement 
or negligence is a passive party. 
9. The Court erred in not allowing a trial on the 
issue that the aircraft in question was defective. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT, TRANS-WEST, IS ENTITLED TO 
INDEMNIFICATION FROM THE DEFENDANT, 
CESSNA AIRCRAFT. 
The general law with respect to sales and in 
particular implied warranties of merchantable quality or 
fitness for intended purposes holds that the ultimate seller 
of the product has the right of indemnification back over 
against the distributors, wholesalers, and manufacturers, 
from whom he obtained the product for sale to the ultimate 
-10-
consumer, 41 Am Jur 2d 717, Indemnity § 
the award of attorney's fees as part of 
the indemnification award, Massingale v^ Northwest Cortez, 
Inc., 620 P.2d 1009 (Wash. App., 1980), 
ultimate seller stands in the position of being either 
25. This includes 
the damages comprising 
so long as the 
of the product to 
has not modified, 
passive or merely a conduit in the sale 
the ultimate consumer where that seller\ 
altered, changed, or otherwise dealt wi-j:h the product in a 
negligent manner. 
The Oregon Appellate Court injDavidson v. Parker, 
622 P.2d 1113, 1118 (Ore. App., 1981) observed: 
"Where a retailer delivers goods to a 
buyer without creating a defeat in the 
product, it is only secondarily liable 
for that defect and is entitled to 
indemnity from the manufacturer." 
Utah recognizes this law. Saijione v. J. C. Penney 
Company, 404 P.2d 248 (Utah, 1965). In 
store's right to maintain its third-par^y complaint against 
an escalator manufacturer where a child!was injured on the 
escalator was affirmed by the Supreme C6urt. 
Every person must act or use that which he controls 
so as not to injure another. If his actions do injure 
another, then a third person who is called upon, under some 
theory of law, to respond to those damages may look to that 
person who is primarily liable for the recovery of any 
damages awarded against that third perspn. Holmstead v. 
this case, a department 
-11-
Abbott G. M. Diesel, Inc., 493 P.2d 625 (Utah, 1965). See 
also Hartwig Farms v. Pacific Gamble Robinson, 625 P.2d 171 
(Wash., 1981). 
In products liability cases, the manufacturer has 
an implied duty to defend the retailer, and the manufacturer 
is liable to the retailer for attorney's fees if it fails to 
defend. Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, 604 P.2d 
1059 (Alaska, 1983). 
In D. G. Shelter Products v. Moduline Industries, 
684 P.2d 839 (Alaska, 1984), the court in footnote 8 observed: 
"The 'general rule1 was stated in Heritage 
v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 
1059, 1067 (Alaska 1979), quoting Addy v. Bolton, 
257 S.C. 28, 183 S.E.2d 708, 710 (1971): 
ff[I]n actions of indemnity, brought where 
the duty to indemnify is either implied 
by law or arises under contract, and no 
personal fault of the indemnitee has 
joined in causing the injury^ reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in resisting the 
claim indemnified against may be recovered 
as part of the damages and expenses. 
(Emphasis added)" 
Clearly, Trans-West had the right to maintain its 
cross-claim for indemnification against Cessna. 
POINT TWO 
WRITTEN TENDER IS NOT REQUIRED TO 
ACTIVATE THE DUTY OF INDEMNIFICATION. 
Cessna asserted that a written tender of defense 
must have been given to it by Trans-West before Cessna had 
any duty to defend or answer in indemnification. 
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It is a fact which is not in djispute that such a 
written tender was not made by Trans-Wes|t. 
It is a fact, however, that Cessna was a party 
defendant with Trans-West in this actionj and, therefore, had 
actual notice of the pendency of the act|ion. 
It is a further fact that Tran|s-West gave oral 
notice of the pendency of the action to (Cessna's zone manager 
immediately after the commencement of tl^ e action and requested 
that Cessna defend Trans-West, which request was summarily 
denied. 
Case law points out that a tehder is not a prereq-
uisite to fix liability under indemnification. Miller v. 
New York Oil Co. , 243 P. 118 (Wyo, 1926)| 
reaffirmed in Pan American Petroleum v. 
This doctrine was 
Maddox Well Service, 
586 P.2d 1120 (Wyo, 1979). 
The Alaska Supreme Court in D. G. Shelter Products 
v. Moduline Industries, 684 P.2d 839 (Alaska, 1984), after 
pointing out that proper notice of the litigation should be 
given so that the indemnitor could prepare a defense, then 
said: 
"A tender of defense by the indemnitee, 
however, is not required since it can be 
inferred upon timely notice of the pending 
action. Bedal v. Hallack & Howard Lumber 
Co. , 226 F.2d 526, 535-36 (9th Cir, 1955)." 
The same holding was affirmed in Hales v. Green 
Colonial, Inc., 402 F. Supp 738 (Mo., 1975); Ward v. City 
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National Bank & Trust Co,, 379 S.W.2d 614 (Mo., 1964), and 
the numerous cases cited therein. 
Many cases have gone even further in holding that 
notice, as opposed to tender, is not even required unless 
the indemnitee seeks to bind the indemnitor to the original 
judgment or determination of liability. McStain Corp. v. 
Elfine Plumbing & Heating Inc., 558 P.2d 588 (Colo. App., 
1976) ; Insurance Company of North America v. Hawkins, 246 
N.W.2d 878 (Neb., 1976); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. 
Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 38 N.W. 360 (N.Y., 1895); 
Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son Inc., 268 S.E.2d 296 (W. Va.). 
In 42 CJS Indemnity § 32a(2) (1944), it is stated: 
"The omission to give notice to the indemnitor, 
however, does not affect the right of action 
against him, but simply changes the burden of 
proof and imposes on the indemnitee the necessity 
of again litigating and establishing all of the 
actionable facts." 
Cited with approval in Illinois Central Railroad v. Blaha, 
89 N.W.2d 197, 201-02 (Wis., 1958). The same rationale was 
applied in Jennings v. United States, 374 F.2d 983 (4th 
Cir., 1967), wherein the court observed: 
"The concept that notice plus an opportunity 
to defend render binding on an indemnitor the 
judgment in a case in which he did not parti-
cipate springs from notions of res judicata." 
In the case now before the Court, Cessna not only had notice, 
but was a party defendant and in effect controlled the 
conduct of the case and then settled the action without the 
participation of Trans-West in the settlement negotiations. 
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to 
si 
Tran 
It is respectfully submitted 
that no tender of defense is required 
of indemnification, nor for that matter 
the instant case actual notice was giveiji 
of the action against Cessna, Trans-We 
notice and demand for defense made by 
it had ample opportunity to participate 
The argument that Trans-West 
action for indemnification is without 
POINT THREE 
THE RIGHT TO INDEMNIFICATION MAY BE 
PREDICATED UPON AN IMPLIED CONTRACT 
THEORY• 
that the law is clear 
maintain an action 
is notice, but as in 
both by the institution 
and others and the 
s-West of Cessna, 
in the defense, 
cfcannot maintain its 
it. mer 
The question has been raised 
field of indemnification as to whether 
is founded on contract or tort. Genera 
Cuban American Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89 
The two types of indemnity rest on s 
theoretical bases and require proof and 
elements. Parfait v. Jahncke Service, 
Coilirt, 
(5th Cir., 1973). 
In the case now before the 
manufacturer, designed, built and manu 
and sold the same to its distributor wh<£> 
Trans-West, the ultimate seller. Thus, 
sold to Trans-West with the same implied 
many times in the 
^he right of action 
Electric Co. v. 
epafate 
(5th Cir., 1968). 
and distinct 
evaluation of different 
Inc., 484 F.2d 296 
Cessna, as a 
f^ctured an aircraft 
in turn sold it to 
the aircraft was 
warranty of merchant-
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ability as that which ran with this sale to the ultimate 
purchaser and user. 
The implied warranty of merchantability creates an 
implied contract in law. Whittle v. Timesavers, Inc., 572 
F. Supp 584 (Va., 1983); Paradis v. A.L. Nichols, 12 N.E.2d 
863 (Mass., 1938). And this implied contract in law creates 
an implied indemnity. 
In the case of Morningstar v. Black & Decker 
Manufacturing Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va., 1979), the West 
Virginia court acknowledged the right of implied indemnity 
and stated: 
"Most Courts recognize that a seller who 
does not contribute to the defect may 
have an implied indemnity remedy against 
the manufacturer, when the seller is sued 
by the user." 
Thus, the Court may predicate the right of indemni-
fication upon an implied contract between Cessna as the 
manufacturer of a product, and Trans-West as the intermediate 
purchaser who bought the product with the same warranties as 
were ultimately provided the end buyer-user (the plaintiffs 
in this suit). The right of indemnification, however, does 
not hinge on this theory only, but can and in many jurisdictions 
does predicate itself on negligence or express contract 
theories. 
It would seem that this is a situation of first 
impression before the courts of Utah. 
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POINT FOUR 
TRANS-WEST'S RIGHT TO INDEMNIFICATION 
EXISTS REGARDLESS OF THE THEORY USED. 
As pointed out in the various cases cited herein, 
the right of indemnification exists whether one wishes to 
espouse the theory of active-passive negligence as between a 
manufacturer and a seller who sells without modification or 
change, or an express contract or an implied contract arising 
from the express and/or implied warranties of fitness and 
merchantability. 
Based upon either of these theories, the law of 
Utah not being clear as to which one applies, Trans-West is 
still entitled to indemnification, whiclj doctrine Utah does 
recognize. 
In Holmstead v. Abbott G. M. iiiesel, Inc., 493 
P.2d 625 (Utah, 1972), the Utah court recognized and cited 
with approval § 96 of the Restatement off the Law of Restitution, 
which states: 
"A person who, without personal fault, 
has become subject to tort liability 
for the unauthorized and wrongful 
conduct of another, is entitled to 
indemnity from the other for expendi-
tures properly made in the discharge 
of such liability." 
The Supreme Court went on to state that:! 
"Subrogation is said to be a creation 
of equity for the purpose of effecting 
an adjustment between parties so as to 
secure ultimately the payment or discharge 
of a debt by a person who in good conscience 
ought to pay for it." 
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Applying this philosophy of having the party who 
in good conscience pay for the wrongdoing in the instant 
case, it is clear that it is Cessna, the party who was the 
active participant in the manufacture of a bad product, who 
should be called upon to pay the costs and expenses incurred 
by Trans-West in defending itself from the wrongs of Cessna, 
as it stands as a mere conduit in the stream of commerce, a 
passive participant who had the misfortune to be named as a 
party defendant along with an active negligent party or a 
party who actively breached its duties of warranty. 
POINT FIVE 
TRANS-WEST IS ENTITLED TO THE AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AS A PART OF ITS 
DAMAGES. 
Trans-West asserts that as it is entitled to 
indemnification, whether it be by implied contract, express 
contract, or under a tort negligence theory and that the 
right of such indemnification is affirmed as the general law 
throughout the United States. Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & 
Son, 268 S.E.2d 296 (W. Va.), and the extensive cases cited 
therein. 
As a part of the damages incurred by Trans-West, 
it asserts that it is entitled to the reimbursement of the 
attorney's fees and costs that it paid out in defense of 
this action. 
Cessna, on the other hand, points out that there 
is no basis for the award of attorney's fees as under Utah 
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law, there is no written contract nor stjatute authorizing 
the award of attorney's fees in this type of case. 
Cessna misses the point asserted by Trans-West, 
that is, that attorney's fees are a part of the damages 
awardable under an indemnification theor|y, and not a separate 
award of fees distinct from damages. 
The cases throughout the Unitdd States have almost 
uniformly allowed attorneys fees as a part of the indemnifi-
cation to which a seller is entitled frcjm a manufacturer 
where the manufacturer has been the actijve participant in 
the creation of a defective product and 
passive participant in the transaction, 
alteration, repair or otherwise to the failure of the product 
sold. 
The payment of attorney's fee3 is recognized as a 
part of indemnification under § 80, Restatement of the Law 
of Restitution, and the cases cited thereunder. Kentucky 
recognized this principle in 1972 in Chifttom v. Abell, 485 
the seller is a 
who has not added by 
S.W.3d 231, 237 (Ky. , 1972) (reversed or} other grounds) in 
holding that where there was a failure to discharge a duty 
to provide a defense on a claim for damages, the indemnitee 
would be entitled to the award of attorney's fees paid for a 
defense of the action. 
This same theory was adopted tiy Florida in 1979 in 
Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stevenson,) 370 S.2d 1211, 
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1214, (Fla., 1979) (reversed on other grounds) wherein the 
court noted that a principal is subject to a duty to exonerate 
an agent for the expense of defending actions brought by 
third parties which are unfounded but not brought in bad 
faith. In an earlier case, Insurance Co. of North America 
v. King, 340 So.2d 1175 (Fla. App., 1976), the court observed: 
" . . . Generally an indemnitee is entitled 
to recover, as part of his damages, reasonable 
attorneys fees, and reasonable and proper legal 
costs and expenses, which he is compelled to 
pay as the result of suits by or against him 
in reference to the matter against which he is 
indemnified." 
This case goes on to point out that the allegations 
of wrongdoing in the plaintiffs1 complaint are not sufficient 
to allow the wrongdoing party to escape liability by setting 
up the defense of the allegations of the complaint as Cessna 
attempts to do in this case. The court stated: 
"A plaintiff should not be able to 
arbitrarily deprive a defendant of his 
right to indemnification from a third 
party by alleging that he was actively 
negligent when in fact that defendant 
is found not to have been actively 
negligent." 
In a case on all fours factually with the present 
case, the Texas Appellate Court in Champion Mobile Homes v. 
Rasmussen, 553 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App., 1977) , in relying 
on § 93 of the Restatement of the Law of Restitution, observed 
that the Restatement provides that where a person (such as 
the manufacturer) has supplied to another (such as the 
retailer) a chattel which, because of the supplier's negligence 
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riird person injured 
J is under a duty to 
or other fault, is dangerously defective for the use for 
which it is supplied, and both the supplier and the second 
party have become liable in tort to a ti 
by such use, the supplier (manufacturer) 
indemnify the second party (retailer) f<br expenditures made 
in discharge of the third person's claim. 
Section 93 of the Restatement! 
Restitution states: 
of the Law of 
"(1) Where a person has supplied to another 
a chattel which because of th£ supplier's 
negligence or other fault is dangerously 
defective for the use for which it is supplied 
and both have become liable in tort to a third 
person injured by such use, the supplier is under 
a duty to indemnify the other!for expenditures 
properly made in discharge of I the claim of the 
third person, if the other used or disposed 
of the chattel in reliance upon the supplier's 
care and if, as between the two, such reliance 
was justified." 
The significant words to be noted in the Champion 
case and § 93 of the Restatement is "expenditures properly 
made" (emphasis mine). 
Is it not true, attorney's fe^s tall within the 
definition of an expenditure? 
Is it not the intent of indemnification to shift 
over to the defaulting or wrongdoing pafty the cost and 
expense incurred by the innocent party? 
How can this equitable principle be carried out if 
the costs and expenses (which include attorney's fees) are 
not paid? 
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It is to be noted that the word expenditures is 
used in both Sections 90 and 93 of the Restatement of the 
Law of Restitution. 
Thus, in St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Crosetti Bros., Inc., 475 P.2d 69 (Ore., 1970), the Oregon 
Supreme Court ruled: 
"The rule in most jurisdictions, regardless 
of whether indemnity is based upon an implied 
or an express agreement, is that when a claim 
is made against an indemnitee for which he is 
entitled to indemnification, the indemnitor is 
liable for any reasonable expenses incurred by 
the indemnitee in defending against such claim, 
regardless of whether the indemnitee is 
ultimately held not liable. Paliaga v. Lucken-
back Steamship Co., 301 F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 
1962); Miller and Company of Birmingham v. 
Louisville & N. R. Co., 328 F.2d 73, 78 (5th 
Cir., 1964); Southern Arizona York Refrigeration 
Co. v. Bush Mfg. Co., 331 F.2d 1, 60 (9th Cir., 
1964); O'Connell v. Jackson, 273 Minn. 91, 140 
N.W.2d 65, 69 (1966); Commercial Standard Ins. 
Co. v. Cleveland, 86 Ariz. 288, 345 P.2d 210, 
216 (1959); Restatement, Restitution § 80, 
Comment b., 356. We so hold. Statements in 
New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Terrall, 165 Or. 390, 
107 P.2d 843 (1940), and National Surety Co. v. 
Johnson, 115 Or. 624, 239 P. 538 (1925) are not 
to be construed to the contrary." 
Idaho adopted the rationale and authority of the 
Oregon Court in Farber v. State, 682 P.2d 630 (Idaho, 1984). 
Indemnification has been recognized in common law 
and in the case of Southern Arizona York Refrigeration v. 
Bush Mfg. Co., 331 F.2d 1 (9th Cir., 1964), the federal 
court held that only that if the indemnitee establishes its 
right to indemnity is it entitled to recover its costs 
including attorney's fees incurred in defending the action. 
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The Restatement of Torts 2d § 
"(2) One who through the tort 
has been required to act in trie 
of his interests by bringing qr 
an action against a third per 
to recover reasonable compensajt 
of time, attorney fees and othe 
thereby suffered or incurred i|n 
action." 
of another 
protection 
defending 
^on is entitled 
ion for loss 
r expenditures 
the earlier 
For further discussion and ca 
of attorneys fees is proper, see United 
3es holding the award 
States Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 505 P.2d 
This case summarizes common law indemnify 
Restatement of the Law of Restitution § 
The Washington Court of Appea 
the law in Wagner v. Beech Aircraft Cor^ > 
(Wash. App., 1984), and stated: 
"In Aldrich & Hedman, Inc., vJ 
31 Wash. App. 16, 639 P.2d 23 
Court of Appeals reviewed the 
state with respect to the riglit 
to recover attorney's fees anq 
costs. The Court summarized 
follows: 
"Attorney's fees are generally not recov-
erable in the absence of contract, statute, 
or a recognized ground of equity. Where 
the natural and proximate consequence of 
the acts or omissions of a party to an 
agreement or an event have exposed one to 
litigation with a third person, equity 
may allow attorney's fees as an element of 
consequential damages. Three elements are 
necessary to create this equitable right to 
recover attorney's fees: (1) 
or omission by A towards B; (2 
omission exposes or involves Ip 
with C; and (3) C was not connected with the 
914 (2) states: 
137 (Oregon, 1973). 
as summarized by 
76. 
s aptly summarized 
. , 680 P.2d 425 
Blakely, 
(1982), the 
law in this 
of a litigant 
other defense 
law as the 
a wrongful act 
) such act or 
in litigation 
original wrongful act or omis? 
towards B." 
ion of A 
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Wyoming adheres to the award of attorney's fees in 
an indemnification situation and has done so for many years. 
Miller v., New York Oil Co. (supra) . 
Alaska in D. G. Shelter Products v. Moduline 
Industries (supra), in approving the award of attorney's 
fees in the footnote to the decision, observed: 
"5. The 'general rule' was stated in Heritage 
v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 
1059, 1967 (Alaska 1979), quoting Addy v. 
Bolton, 257 S.C. 28, 183 S.E.2d 708, 710 
(1971): 
[I]n actions of indemnity, brought where 
the duty to indemnify is either implied by 
law or arises under contract, and no personal 
fault of the indemnitee has joined in causing 
the injury, reasonable attorney's fees incurred 
in resisting the claim indemnified against may 
be recovered as part of the damages and 
expenses. (Emphasis added) 
"We note what appears to be a technical error 
in our published opinion in Heritage. The 
italicized language in the above paragraph 
does not appear in Addy v. Bolton, which 
Heritage purports to quote. Heritage, 
nevertheless, accurately states the 
general rule." 
In the case of Vallegos v. C. E. Glass Company, 
583 F.2d 507 (10th Cir., 1978), the Circuit Court of Appeals 
observed: 
"It is true that in connection with indemnity 
claims recovery may generally be had for 
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in 
defense against the principal claim, but not 
for those incurred in establishing the right 
of indemnity." (Citing extensive authority) 
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Trans-West has not asserted a claim tor |any costs or attorney's 
fees with respect to the matters arising since the settlement 
of the claims of the plaintiffs. 
In a case based on the passiv^ negligence of a 
seller of an automobile as opposed to the active negligence 
of the manufacturer, Ford Motor Company J 
in Insurance Company of North America v. 
the Florida Court 
King, 340 So.2d 
1175 (Fla. App., 1976), ruled: 
"In these circumstances, we hc|ld that 
Fort Lauderdale Lincoln-Mercuijy, Inc., as 
indemnitee is entitled to recover from 
Ford Motor Company, as part of its damages 
reasonable attorneyfs fees and reasonable 
and proper legal costs and expenses. . . . " 
In a later case, where the indemnitee was successful in 
defending itself against the claims of the plaintiff and, 
therefore, did not have to pay any judgment, the Florida 
court reversed the trial court which denied the imposition 
of attorney's fees that the indemnitee riaid out in the 
defense. In this case, Pender v. Skillqraft Industries, Inc., 
358 So.2d 45 (Fla. App., 1978), the cou^t point out 
"We therefore reverse the lowq 
denial of the cross-claim for 
cation and hold that if a retailer would 
indemnifi-
court costs 
clearly have been entitled to 
cation of attorney's fees and 
if it had lost in the main actjion and had 
a judgment rendered against it] (for passive 
negligence, breach of implied 
strict liability), then it will be equally 
entitled to such indemnification in the 
event that it should successfully defend 
itself in the main action." 
r court's 
indemnifi-
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This is precisely the position taken by Cessna, 
that as Trans-West was not compelled to pay anything on the 
settlement, that it is not entitled to any indemnification 
of its costs of defense. Such is not the law as pointed out 
in Pender, 
Many of the other cases cited in this brief have 
authorized the award of attorney's fees to the indemnitee, 
such as Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 402 F. Supp 738 (Mo., 
1975). In Whittle v. Timesavers, Inc., 572 F. Supp 584 
(Va., 1983), the imposition of attorney's fees was predicated 
upon an implied contract and, thus, authorized under the 
theory of the existence of a contract. 
See also Alterman Foods, Inc., v. G.C.C. Beverages, 
Inc. , 310 S.E.2d 755 (Ga., 1983). 
It is submitted that the claim of Cessna to the 
effect that Trans-West did not extricate itself from the 
lawsuit in a timely manner is totally without merit. A 
reading of the complaint, objectively, shows that the allega-
tions of the plaintiffs' complaint were only indirectly 
aimed at Trans-West. 
The basic claims were that the aircraft was not 
constructed properly nor were the components fit for the 
purposes for which they were made and sold. Trans-West, as 
the seller, under the generally recognized principles of 
products liability law, was properly in the lawsuit, but 
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only as a passive party. The law of indemnification in 
these types of suits is clear and almost without exception, 
that Trans-West was entitled to indemnification and that it 
is entitled to recoup its out-of-pocket costs and expenses 
and costs of defense including reasonable attorney's fees. 
In the case of Herman v. General Irrigation Co., 
247 N.W.2d 472 (N.D., 1976), the North Dakota court held: 
"It is the general rule that a retailer 
or other seller suffering and paying a 
judgment against him by an injured person 
in a warranty action is entitled to 
indemnity from a manufacturer who 
sold the product to him with a similar 
warranty. 3 Frumer & Friedman Products 
Liability § 44.03[1]. And in the field 
of products liability, the concept under-
lying allowance of indemnity is that the 
indemnitee has been rendered ljiable because 
of a nondelegable duty arising out of 
common or statutory law, but the actual 
cause of the injury has been t^ he act of 
another person. 3 Frumer & Friedman, 
supra, § 44.02 [2]. See Burbage v. Boiler 
Engineering and Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 
249 A.2d 563 (1969) 
As pointed out in other cases, whether a judgment 
is rendered or not, the costs of defense are recoverable 
under indemnification. 
To hold otherwise would be to in effect say to the 
seller, "let the plaintiff get a judgment as we will be 
repaid by the manufacturer and let's not worry about a 
defense to what may be a case without merit." 
In the case now before the Court, Trans-West did 
nothing wrong, other than to sell a bad aircraft which it 
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did not make, design, manufacture, equip or assemble, and, 
thus, it defended its position of no liability to the plaintiffs. 
Had it paid $10,000 or $20,000 in settlement, would Cessna 
now admit that it was liable to Trans-West for the settlement 
sums paid? The writer does not believe that the Supreme 
Court is that naive as to believe that Cessna would admit 
that it would be liable for any such payments. But is there 
a difference between monies expended in defending against a 
claim and paying that claim, when it comes to indemnification? 
The answer is no. 
Trans-West is entitled to be made whole in this 
matter and that includes the payment of its costs of defense 
which include reasonable attorney's fees. 
Cessna asserts that it was never adjudicated as 
being liable to the plaintiff in this case nor was the 
aircraft determined to have been faulty or negligently 
constructed, therefore, Trans-West has no cause of action. 
In short, it is asserting the hypothesis that 
before Trans-West is entitled to indemnification there must 
have been a complete adjudication of the case on its merits. 
It is respectfully submitted, that while many of 
the cases cited herein did in fact arise after the adjudication 
or liability of the manufacturer, still the damages suffered 
by the retailer, Trans-West, were complete and actual by 
merely defending the action brought against it and the 
manufacturer. 
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theory that to do 
It is submitted that the law is or should be in 
i 
Utah that all damages incurred by the retailer not through 
its fault or active negligent conduct are compensable from 
the manufacturer. 
To compel the retailer to refuse to settle any 
case or actively attempt to block the settlement of the 
primary parties to litigation under the 
otherwise would constitute a waiver of Its rights of indemni-
fication, is to not only invite continued litigation but to 
emasculate the settlement process which1is one of the foundations 
of the legal profession. 
If this is the law, then the law needs to be 
changed. If the law is unclear, then tpe Supreme Court 
should define what the law is in this regard so that future 
innocent retailers will know that once a product liability 
suit is filed, it must be tried to the ultimate and final 
conclusion, regardless of the wishes of|the plaintiff or the 
! 
I 
manufacturer-defendant, and regardless of the merits of the 
case or that a good faith settlement may be made without the 
loss of rights to be made whole by the ijianufacturer. Cessna 
would have the Court reach this conclusion. Cessna asserts 
that this is the law. 
Cessna further asserts that the settlement documents 
that it was instrumental in preparing specifically state 
that there is no admission of liability!or of negligence on 
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the part of Cessna. Trans-West admits this. Any settlement 
document which is prepared by competent counsel would have 
such an exculpatory clause in it. However, it is submitted 
that such a clause does not repair the injury to the retailer-
seller's pocketbook. It still had to defend itself against 
the slings and arrows of the plaintiff, and in raising its 
shield to do so, it defended the very product which it had 
no part of creating, designing, making or equipping, to the 
benefit of the manufacturer. 
POINT SIX 
THE LAW OF INDEMNIFICATION DOES NOT REQUIRE 
THAT THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES BE FULLY 
ADJUDICATED BEFORE THE PASSIVE DEFENDANT MAY 
MAINTAIN HIS ACTION FOR INDEMNIFICATION. 
The law is clear that a claim of indemnification 
will lie by way of cross-claim or third-party complaint 
whenever an action is commenced whereby a named party defendant 
has the right of claim against another defendant or another 
party. 
Rule 13 (f) and Rule 14 (a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, authorize and sanction this procedure. 
In Stanley Title Company v. Continental Bank and 
Trust Company, 26 U.2d 121, 485 P.2d 1400 (1971), the Utah 
Supreme Court observed: 
"Under Rule 13 (f), U.R.C.P., it is no 
longer necessary that the liability sued 
upon in the cross claim must first have 
become fixed by a judgment as at common 
law." (Citing authority) 
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The Utah Supreme Court reversed a dismissal of a 
cross-claim for indemnification in the case of Sanone v. 
J. C. Penney Company, 404 P.2d 248 (Utah, 1965). 
Thus, Cessna's contention that Trans-West cannot 
maintain its cross-claim against Cessna for indemnification 
is without merit. 
POINT SEVEN 
CESSNA KNEW THAT UPON READING THE COMPLAINT 
THAT TRANS-WEST WAS A PASSIVE SELLER AND THAT 
IT KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT IT HAD THE 
DUTY TO DEFEND THE ACTION. 
It is obvious from the reading of the complaint of 
the plaintiffs in this matter that the responsibility of 
Trans-West was that of a passive seller of a product which 
had been manufactured by the defendant Cessna. 
All of the allegations, while mentioning Trans-
West, run to the manufacture, design, and equipping of the 
P-210 aircraft and to the method of financing carried on 
exclusively by Cessna or Cessna Finance Company, the wholly 
owned subsidiary of Cessna. 
There is no one single allegation of the complaint 
that runs to alleged conduct of Trans-W^st which was not 
tied in as a seller of the product manufactured, designed 
and equipped by Cessna or which ran to the financing of the 
aircraft by Cessna Finance. 
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The contention of Cessna that the complaint spelled 
out culpable negligence or misrepresentation on the part of 
Trans-West is just not spelled out in the complaint. 
As stated in Insurance Company of North America 
v. King, 340 So.2d 1175 (Fla. App., 1976): 
"A plaintiff should not be able to arbitrarily 
deprive a defendant of his right to indemnifi-
cation from a third party by alleging that he 
was actively negligent when in fact that defendant 
is found not to have been actively negligent." 
Wording this another way is to say that Cessna 
cannot take the unproven accusations of the plaintiffs1 
complaint and assert that as the plaintiffs asserted the 
active participation of Trans-West in either the breach of 
warranties or negligence, whichever theory the plaintiffs 
were proceeding on, and use this as a means of ducking out 
of an indemnification liability. 
From the very wording of the complaint and a 
knowledge that Trans-West did not modify or alter the aircraft 
and in fact did not even have the physical facilities to do 
so, the defense of Cessna that Trans-West did not work the 
case into a posture of where Cessna should have taken over 
the defense is without merit and should be summarily dismissed. 
POINT EIGHT 
THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS OF THIS CASE 
ESTABLISH THAT TRANS-WEST WAS A PASSIVE 
PARTY. 
Cessna asserts that Trans-West is not entitled to 
indemnification because there was no court adjudication that 
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Trans-West was liable to and compelled to pay damages to the 
plaintiff. 
Cessna did not dispute any of the uncontroverted 
facts asserted by Trans-West which factually establish it as 
a passive party or a passive tortfeasor^ 
Cessna asserts that there had to be an adjudication 
that the aircraft was faulty before indemnification arose. 
It is submitted that this is not the law, or if it 
is the law in some jurisdictions, it should not be the law 
in Utah. 
It is submitted that the better law is that where, 
if the status of being passive as opposed to active, is 
shown by the uncontroverted facts, whether or not ultimate 
liability is established is immaterial ^s to the passive 
party, as it is still obligated to defend and still incurs 
costs, expenses, and damages, including its attorney's fees, 
not through what it did, other than fall into the unhappy 
role of the ultimate retailer (seller), but by virtue of its 
status, while the manufacturer, whether or not it extricates 
itself from the charges, who caused the problem in the first 
place says, try the case, otherwise no indemnification. 
Trans-West was ready to pick up the gauntlet as to 
the issues of there having been a faulty aircraft produced 
by Cessna and as to the passive position of itself, but was 
precluded from doing so by the trial court not permitting it 
to go forward and prove those things at the scheduled trial 
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that Cessna now claims were necessary before indemnification 
could be invoked. 
Cessna espouses case after case which indicate 
that a full adjudication of the question of liability of the 
party seeking indemnification must be determined, but then 
asserts that it was entitled to summary judgment on the 
question of indemnification because the trial date was a few 
days after the date for the hearing of the motions for 
summary judgment. 
If Cessna is right, then it is patently error for 
the trial court to strike the trial date and preclude that 
issue which Cessna claims is dispositive of Trans-West's 
right to indemnification. 
This is a matter of seeking to have one's cake and 
eat it too. 
POINT NINE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING 
A TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF THE DEFECTIVE 
AIRCRAFT. 
Cessna asserts that there was no showing that the 
aircraft in question was defective, thus, there was no 
responsibility for Cessna to indemnify Trans-West. 
Further, there was no court adjudication that 
Trans-West was a passive party as opposed to an active 
tortfeasor. 
These issues were set down for trial by the trial 
court, but then both parties filed motions for summary 
-34-
date and upon ruling 
s cause of action, 
the aircraft in 
at best a passive 
judgment and the court struck the trial 
in favor of Cessna dismissed Trans-West 
thusf the issue of the defectiveness of 
question has not been adjudicated, nor ^n adjudication of 
the status of Trans-West, although the ifincontested facts 
clearly demonstrate that Trans-West was 
negligent party. 
If the Supreme Court determines that the law is 
that there must be an adjudication of the existence of a 
faulty product before indemnification of a seller will lie, 
then the trial court erred in not allowing a trial on this 
issue and that matter should be remandecfi back to the trial 
court for a determination of this issuei 
Utah law is clear that where there is a material 
genuine issue of fact undecided, summary judgment will not 
lie, Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 
(Utah, 1984); Hobelman Motors, Inc., v. 
(Utah, 1984) 
Allred, 685 P.2d 544 
The trial court could not clo^e its eyes to the 
issues of the ultimate liability of Trans-West under the 
facts of the plaintiff's case, if that ikltimate liability 
was in fact and law necessary to decide the case. 
If the Supreme Court decides ^hat those ultimate 
facts had to be decided, then clearly, ^rans-West is entitled 
to its day in Court to prove those elements which are required 
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to invoke indemnification. Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 
(Utah, 1984); McBride v. Jones, 615 P.2d 431 (Utah, 1980). 
It has not been afforded this constitutional and statutory 
right in this matter, and, thus, the trial court's summary 
judgment must be reversed and the matter remanded back for 
trial on the issues. 
This would be a material genuine issue of fact 
which would preclude summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
in this matter and which was clearly before the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that under the equitable 
principles as recognized by the State of Utah, either by the 
adoption of common law or by the better case law adopted 
throughout the United States, which Utah should adopt, that 
where a retail seller is beset with having to defend a 
manufacturer for a manufacturer defect in a product, the 
seller is entitled to recoup its losses for defending the 
action, which it is a party to by reason of its being a 
passive, tortfeasor, or by being a party to an implied contract 
of indemnity. 
It is further respectfully submitted that the 
better law throughout the United States would afford relief 
to Trans-West in this matter for its attorney's fees and 
costs as a part of the damages suffered by Trans-West that 
it was compelled to obligate itself in defending against the 
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claims of plaintiffs, who were seeking, and did in fact 
assert and compel a substantial settlement from the manufacturer, 
thus, showing that the airplane was indeed faulty and subject 
to the claims of the plaintiffs for design and manufacturing 
defect. 
It is respectfully submitted that the damages 
which include attorney's fees sought in this matter should 
be granted and that Trans-West Aircraft Sales, Inc.'s motion 
for summary judgment should have been granted as against 
Cessna Aircraft Company. 
It is respectfully submitted that in the alternative 
this matter should be remanded back to the Trial Court for a 
trial on the issues of the status of Trans-West being a 
passive party and the question of the alleged defective 
product being sold to the plaintiff thereby raising the 
right of indemnification. 
Re speerE"fi)lly submitted, 
Attorney for Defendant, Appellant 
Trans-West Aircraft Sales, Inc. 
Suite 280, 311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HANOVER LIMITED, a partnership; 
WESTERN MAINTENANCE AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah corpor-
ation; and BROOKE GRANT,.an 
individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a 
Kansas corporation; CESSNA 
FINANCE CORPORATION, a Kansas cor-
poration; TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES, 
INC., a California corporation; 
AAR NORTHWEST, INC., a Delaware 
corporation; and TRANS WEST 
AIRCRAFT SALES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
OF CROSS-CLAIM 
Civil No. C 82-4799 
(Judge David B. Dee) 
The reciprocal motions for summary judgment of cross-
claimant Trans West Aircraft Sales, Inc. and cross-defendants 
Cessna Aircraft Company and Cessna Finance Corporation came 
on regularly for hearing before the Honorable David B. Dee on 
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Thursday, December 5, 1985 with Paul N. Cotro-Manes representing 
the cross-claimant, H. Wayne Wadsworth representing cross-defen-
dant Cessna Aircraft Company and Robert L. Stevens representing 
cross-defendant Cessna Finance Corporation. 
After argument of counsel, the Court took the matter 
under advisement and now being fully advised in the premises 
and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The motions for summary judgment of Cessna Aircraft 
Company and Cessna Finance Corporation be, and the same hereby 
are, granted and judgment is entered in favor of said cross-defen 
dants dismissing the cross-claim of Trans West Aircraft Sales, 
Inc. with prejudice and upon the merits; and 
2. The motion for summary judgment of cross-claimant 
Trans West Aircraft Sales, Inc. be, atid the same hereby is, 
denied. 
DATED this day of December, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID B. DEE 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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13 (f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(f) Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a cross-
claim any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original 
action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is 
the subject matter of the original action. Such cross-claim may include 
a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to 
the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against 
the cross-claimant. 
RULE 14 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE 
(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any time after 
commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may 
cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to 
the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's 
claim against him. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make 
the service if he files the third-party complaint not later than ten days after 
he serves his original answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion 
upon notice to all parties to the action. The person served with the sum-
mons and third-party complaint, hereinafter called the third-party defend-
ant, shall make his defenses to the third-party plaintiff's claim as provided 
in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff and cross-
claims against other third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The 
third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any defenses which 
the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. The third-party de-
fendant may also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim 
against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against 
the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that 
is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plain-
tiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as 
provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and cross-claims as provided in 
Rule 13. A third-party defendant may proceed under this rule against any 
person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or 
part of the claim made in the action against the third-party defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
HANOVER LIMITED, a partnership; 
WESTERN MAINTENANCE AND 
MANAGEMENT, INC., A Utah 
corporation; and BROOKE GRANT, 
an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a 
Kansas corporation; CESSNA 
FINANCE COMPANY, A Kansas 
corporation; TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES 
INC., a California corporation; 
AAR NORTHWEST, INC., a Delaware 
corporation; AND TRANS WEST 
AIRCRAFT SALES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
C i v i l No. C 82-4799 
(Deposition of: 
BROOKE GRANT 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 7th1day of December, 1982, 
the deposition of BROOKE GRANT, produced as a witness herein 
at the instance of the defendant herein, in the above-entitlec| 
action now pending in the above-named!court, was taken before 
VIKI HATTON, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah, commenc|ing at the hour of 9:30 
a.m. of said day at the offices of WAlrKISS & CAMPBELL, 310 
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utpih. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to notice. 
VIKI E. HATTON 
LICENSE #91 
eefiive 
€RVJCe 
#9 Exchange Place Suite 814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801-363-1458 
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way I got to him, 
Q He hadn't called you back, had he, to find out whether or 
not you were still interested in the aircraft? 
A I may have some phone messages to verify that or not, but 
that would be hard for me to tell at this stage. 
Q Anyway, when you went in to see Mr. Battochio, you'd 
already made up your mind, had you not, to buy a Cessna P-210? 
A That's — I try and never make up my mind on buying 
anything until I make sure I can cut the kind of deal I want. 
My business consists of negotiating with situations and 
people, so I try — if your mind is made up, you're not going 
to be able to get a good buy. 
Q So when you walked in to see Mr. Battochio, it wasn't the 
performance of the airplane, or the type of airplane, it was 
how much you were going to pay for the aircraft that made the 
determination as to whether you were going to buy or not; is 
that true? 
A I'd like it to be that open or shut but I don't 
believe it was. We talked a great deal about the airplane, 
about what they could do. 
Q What did he tell you that you didn't already know about 
it? 
A That's — let see, as I can remember, we talked about the 
economics of owning it, talked about the capability it had, I 
think I talked with him about the aspect of putting a 
85 
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that would add to the 
(id not do* 
did he tell you 
think I was selling him 
Robertson stole on it, whether or not 
safety of it, something I ultimately dl; 
Q With respect to the capabilities, 
anything about that aircraft, what it Icould do or didn't do 
that you already didn't know? 
A That's hard for me to say. I wad amassing so much, 
trying to amass so much information about it. He gave me some 
of the advertising brochures that detailed a fair amount about 
the airplane. I think I've got at least one of them that's 
still got the Trans West name on it, ^o, you know, as to 
reliance and whether I was — I don't, 
on the airplane, I think he was selling me on it. 
Q Over and above the information contained in that brochure 
V 
or those brochures, did he tell you anything additional that 
was in those brochures about the performance of the aircraft? 
A I don't think so. You mean did 
recommendations outside of what Cessnlc 
don't remember. I don't remember thai 
Q Would that be true not only of the performance but as to 
the economics of owning that aircraft? 
A No. We had some conversations ru 
would depreciate and what would happen on the curves of — 
210's tended to be a very good airplane to own, they and 
Beechcrafts were the best single engine, so we had some 
discussions on that that I don't thirjik Cessna was representing 
he make any 
|a was representing? I 
t he did. 
egarding how fast it 
86 
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in their material. 
Q Of course, you knew as a businessman and as a banker that 
the economics of owning an aircraft and the resale value of an 
airplane are highly dependent upon the economical situation in 
the country, are they not? 
A Well, I'm not one of thw world's experts on owning 
aircraft, as maybe this case demonstrates. I, you know, I'm 
aware that most things have to do with the economic nature of 
the country, but this was the first really major investment I 
had made in aircraft. Before this, the dollar amounts were 
minuscule. So, you know, I did rely to some extent on the 
experts and I considered Gene one of them. 
Q And you relied upon what he had told you the economics of 
the situation was with respect to this aircraft? 
A I think that's probably a fair statement. 
Q Would you please tell me now specifically what you relied 
upon what he told you? 
A I think that we discussed whether purchasing the plane at 
the price we were talking about, approximately $132,000, would 
be a good economic decision, whether in buying something 
$32,500 less than its list would enable me to own the plane 
for, I think I put two years as a number on it, without 
suffering very much in the way of depreciation. 
Q At the end of that two year period of time, you didn't 
sell this aircraft, did you? 
87 
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